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INTRODUCTION
Rarely has something so common been so misunderstood by so many.
Computers and computer programs dominate our everyday existence in
many ways. Computer programmes are clearly extremely valuable, primarily
because of their utility, and there can be no doubt that the rights attaching to
such programs are worthy of protection. Perhaps because of a lack of a better
alternative1 the international community2 and the South African legal
system3 have chosen to protect the rights attaching to computer programs
through copyright, a form of intellectual property that has been the subject
of international agreement since the Berne Convention of 1886.4 However,
notwithstanding the familiarity of the courts with the legal mechanism of
copyright and the ubiquity of computer programs in our society, the
application of copyright protection to computer programs has proven to be a
serious challenge to some of the best legal minds worldwide.5
This article proposes to analyse critically the South African legal position
on the copyright protection of computer programs as set out in court
* B Eng M Eng (Elec) LLB (Stell) LLM in Computer and Communications Law (London), practising
attorney with Jan S de Villiers Attorneys, Cape Town and non-practising solicitor of the High Court of
England and Wales.
1 Several commentators argue that computer programs do not ﬁt easily into the copyright scheme.A full
discussion of this issue is, however, beyond the scope of this article. See for example John C Phillips ‘Sui
generis intellectual property protection for computer software’ (1993) 60 George Washington LR 997; Sean E
Gordon ‘The very idea! Why copyright is an inappropriate way to protect computer programs’ (1998) 20
European Intellectual Property Review 10; Henry Carr & Richard Arnold Computer Software: Legal Protection in
the United Kingdom 2 ed (1992) 1. See also the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Hersey in the Final
Report of the United States National Commission on New Technology Uses of Copyrighted Works of 31
July 1978 (CONTU Report) — available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/PDF/index.html (last
accessed on 20 April 2002).
2 Article 10(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994
(TRIPS Agreement)
3 Section 2(1)(i) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 as amended (hereinafter ‘the Copyright Act’).
4 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886.
5 For some general discussions on the application of copyright to computer programs see SusanADunn
‘Deﬁning the scope of copyright protection for computer software’ (1986) 38 Stanford LR 497; Arthur R
Miller ‘Copyright protection for computer programs, databases, and computer generated works: Is
anything new since CONTU?’ (1993) 106 Harvard LR 978; Estelle Derclaye ‘Software copyright
protection: Can Europe learn fromAmerican case law? Part 1’ (2000) 22 European Intellectual Property Review
7; and idem Part 2: (2000) 22 European Intellectual Property Review 56; and Daniel J M Attridge ‘Copyright
protection for computer programs’ (2000) 22 European Intellectual Property Review 563; O H Dean
‘Protection of computer programs by copyright in South Africa’ (1995) 6 Stellenbosch LR 86.
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decisions; to identify potential problems that have arisen; and to propose
solutions to such problems by using appropriate international precedents.
The classic dilemma of copyright law, in its attempt to provide an
opportunity for compensation to creators of original works by granting them
a limited monopoly in such works, while simultaneously trying not to stiﬂe
innovation and the creation of further works by others, is particularly visible
in the area of computer programs and will be considered in the course of this
contribution.6
THE NATURE AND GENERAL ELEGIBILITY FOR COPYRIGHT
OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The CopyrightAct deﬁnes a computer program as being ‘a set of instructions
ﬁxed or stored in any manner and which, when used directly or indirectly in
a computer, directs its operation to bring about a result’.7 This deﬁnition,
although undoubtedly accurate, presents an incomplete picture of the
operation of a computer program. Computer programs rarely function in
isolation. Generally computer programs operate on speciﬁc input data to
produce output data. The three different elements contributing to the
operation of a computer program — the input data, the set of instructions
and the output data — therefore have to be identiﬁed and, where possible,
separated.8
Input data is the information that is entered into or accessed by a computer
program and that is acted upon by the set of instructions contained in that
computer program to produce a result. Input data takes on a wide variety of
different forms and will only be protected by copyright if such data
individually or collectively amounts to an eligible work or works under the
Copyright Act.9 Some input data may not qualify for copyright protection at
all,10 but an input data ﬁle may, for example, consist of a collection of written
information and could thus be protectable as a literary work,11 or may
contain photographs, sketches or drawings, which are in themselves artistic
6 The underlying philosophical purpose of intellectual property law is succinctly expressed by art 1 s 8
clause 8 of the Constitution of the United States of America which empowers Congress to ‘promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their writings and discoveries’.
7 Section 1, which closely resembles the deﬁnition in § 101 of the United States Copyright Act 1976,
being ‘a set of instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result’.
8 The distinction may sometimes be difﬁcult, for example, the sequencing of the user interface would
be part of the computer program, but the visual arrangement thereof on the screen would rather be part of
the output data.
9 In particular in terms of s 2.
10 For example, the mouse click commands of a user interacting with a computer program. See also Data
Access Corp v Powerflex Services (Pty) Ltd [1999] HCA 49 where macro-command names were refused
copyright protection, being single words or instructions.
11 Section 1(g) of the deﬁnition of a literary work in the Copyright Act includes ‘tables and compilations
of data stored or embodied in a computer or a medium used in conjunction with a computer’. It should be
noted that this deﬁnition incorrectly presupposes all data to be literary in nature. See for example Haupt v
Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (as yet unreported SCA case no 118/05 decided on 29 March 2006)
and Econostat (Pty) Ltd v Lambrecht 89 JOC (W).
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works.12An input data ﬁle may even contain a ﬁlm or sound recording that is
clearly protected by copyright together with any underlying literary or
musical works. Regarding input data, an interesting point to note is that the
arrangement of the input data ﬁle must be ﬁxed so as to allow the computer
program correctly to interoperate with it.13 Any competitive program
wishing to make use of such existing data ﬁles must therefore make use of the
same data ﬁle arrangement and will not be able to do so if prevented by
copyright.
The computer program causes the computer to perform operations on the
input data in order to produce output data.14 The computer program is thus
merely the set of instructions referred to in the deﬁnition in the Copyright
Act and no more.15 It is not, and should not encompass, the input data or the
output data.16 These instructions are generally written by computer
programmers in language understandable to humans, often referred to as
source code. When completed, the source code program is compiled or
assembled into object code or machine code, which is understandable to a
computer.17 Fundamentally, the act of compilation does not change the
instructions to the computer at all. It merely serves to translate the coded
instructions from one computer language to another. The object code can
also be decompiled or disassembled to reveal the original source code.
Object code is thus merely an adaptation of source code in terms of the
Copyright Act.18 Both the source code and the object code fall within the
Copyright Act’s deﬁnition of a computer program.19 Furthermore, it is clear
that computer code does not have to be ready for commercial exploitation in
order to qualify for protection as a computer program under the Copyright
12 See the deﬁnition of artistic work in s 1(a) of the Copyright Act. This would typically be the case in a
video game. See for example Nintendo Co Ltd v Golden China TV Game Centre supra note 12.
13 This involves the ability of the computer program to correctly read and write information from and to
the data ﬁle. See Total Information Processing Systems Ltd v Daman Ltd [1992] FSR 171 at 177–8.
14 See Kai Tumbraegel & Roux de Villiers ‘Copyright protection for the non-literal elements of a
computer program’ (2004) 10 Computer and Telecommunications LR 34 at 38. A suite or package of programs
interacting with each other could also be used. Under English law such a suite or package of programs could
even be protected as a compilation in itself if original (see IBCOS Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile
Highland Finance Ltd [1994] FSR 275 (ChD) at 290).
15 For an interpretation of the words ‘set of instructions’ see Data Access Corp v Powerflex Services (Pty) Ltd
supra note 10, in which the High Court of Australia holds that a reserved word or macro command name is
not by itself such a set of instructions, nor the collocation of such macro command names.
16 See O H Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law (1998) 1–11. The exception is when input data
forms part of the coding of the program itself, in which event such data cannot constitute a separate work
for copyright purposes, but forms a part, and even a substantial part, of the program. See Gaudron J in Data
Access Corp v Powerflex Services (Pty) Ltd supra note 10 at 127.
17 Some programmers are actually able to program directly in object code, but they are the exception
rather than the rule.
18 Subsection (d)(i) of the deﬁnition of adaptation in s 1 includes for a computer program ‘a version of
the program in a programming language, code or notation different from that of the program’. See also
Apple Computer v Rosy t/a SA Commodity Brokers (Pty) Ltd 134 JOC (D) at 135 and Apple Computer Inc v
Computer Edge (Pty) Ltd [1984] FSR 481 (Fed Ct Aus) and Computer Edge (Pty) Ltd v Apple Computer Inc
[1986] FSR 537 (HC of Aus).
19 Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2005 (1) SA 398 (C) at 410.
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Act, but that a development stage of the program code can also qualify for
such protection.20
The output data is ‘the result’ referred to in the deﬁnition of a computer
program. This result is the end product of the execution of the computer
program’s instructions by the computer hardware. As is the case in regard to
the input data, the output data can take a variety of forms. The output data
will typically include a screen layout or design, which may be an artistic or
literary work in itself.21 In some cases the output data may be a copyright
work or amount to the performance of a copyright work.22 The output data
may even be used to alter the input data of the computer program and thus to
create derivative copyright works. Obviously the output data will not
necessarily attract copyright at all, but will do so if, and only if, it is in itself an
eligible work in terms of the Copyright Act.23 Regarding output data it is
important to note that it requires time and effort for computer users to
familiarize themselves with a user interface, including in particular its output
screens and command structure. Such time and effort obviously involve cost
considerations for computer users, making it difﬁcult for computer users to
change to another computer program with a different user interface.24
Unfortunately, these three elements, namely the input data, the computer
program and the output data, are sometimes lumped together as all being part
of the same work or not properly separated in all respects.25 Although this
approach may appear practically more convenient, it tends to lead to
confusing results in law.26 Strictly speaking, eligibility for copyright
20 Streicher JA in Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (SCA) supra note 11 para 23
rejects an assertion to the contrary as follows: ‘A computer program is deﬁned in s 1 of the Act as ‘‘a set of
instructions ﬁxed or stored in any manner and which, when used directly or indirectly in a computer,
directs its operation to bring about a result’’. It does not require the result to be correct.’ In this regard the
view of Dean op cit note 16 at 1–13 that only the ﬁnal stage of the development process constitutes a
computer program falls to be rejected. See also Sweeney v Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2002 RPC 35 (ChD) for
the protection of the development stages of a literary work.
21 Pastel Software (Pty) Ltd v Pink Software (Pty) Ltd (1991) 399 JOC (T) 408–10, Computer Associates
International Inc v Altai Inc 982 F 2d 693.
22 See for example Nintendo Co Ltd v Golden China TV Game Centre supra note 12 and Golden China TV
Game Centre v Nintendo Co Ltd 1997 (1) SA407 (A), where the output data amounts to the performance of a
cinematograph ﬁlm.
23 In particular it has to comply with s 2. See Sure Travel Ltd v Excel Travel (Pty) Ltd (as yet unreported
WLD case no 22489/04 decided on 19 November 2004).
24 See for example Lotus Development Corp v Borland International Inc 49 F3d 807; Pastel Software (Pty) Ltd v
Pink Software (Pty) Ltd supra note 21.
25 The decision of Streicher JA in Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (SCA) supra note 11 is a
notable exception and must be commended.
26 See Pastel Software (Pty) Ltd v Pink Software (Pty) Ltd supra note 21 at 408–10 in which it was stated that
the output screens were literary works, but also that they were protected as part of the computer program
and, consequently, the court held that a separate computer program that produced similar output screens
was an amendment of the original program and infringed the copyright therein, even though no
reproduction of the underlying code was alleged. This is a misconception. The output screens may be
literary or artistic works in themselves, but they do not form part of the instructions for the computer. They
are merely the result emanating from such instructions. The fact that a program produces output screens
which substantially reproduces and infringes the original screens of another program does therefore not
mean that the underlying program itself is infringed. See also Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v
Rosenstein 1981 (4) SA 123 (C) where it was held that a computer program that produces multiplication
tables or the alphabet will be too trivial to protect under copyright. Strictly speaking this approach
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protection, copyright ownership and infringement for each element should
be evaluated independently, because each element may represent an entirely
different work.27
This approach should not change merely because two or more of the
different elements are stored together on the same device.28 The method or
period of storage or presentation of a computer program, input data or
output data or the fact that a work in digital form is ephemeral29 should not
affect eligibility for copyright in any way, provided that the works are all in
material form, which will be so if the expression contained in the work can
be reproduced as such.30
A fourth element that may acquire separate copyright protection is the
preparatory materials created in the course of designing a computer program.
These materials could include written instructions, ﬂowcharts, user interface
designs etc. Clearly these materials do not meet with the deﬁnition of a
computer program, but often deserve to be protected by copyright
nonetheless, normally as literary or artistic works.31
incorrectly prejudges the content and complexity of a computer program based on the output data it
produces. See also Broderbund Software Inc v Unison World Inc (1986) 648 F Supp 1127. Finally see Nintendo
Co Ltd v Golden China TV Game Centre supra note 12 and Golden China TV Game Centre v Nintendo Co Ltd
supra note 22, both of which held that a video game amounts to a cinematograph ﬁlm. The input data
image ﬁles ﬁxed on the CH-ROM chip may well fall within the deﬁnition of a cinematograph ﬁlm since
such image ﬁles amount to a ﬁxation of images capable of being seen as a moving picture when used with a
computer. Nevertheless, the set of instructions to the computer on the P-ROM chip that enabled the
images to be so viewed would be a distinct and separate work and should be protected as a computer
program, since it is in fact part of the electronic device that enables the images to be seen as a moving
picture.
27 In Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (SCA) supra note 11 Streicher JA expressly criticizes
the court a quo for failing to draw the necessary distinctions and then proceeds to distinguish explicitly
between the different databases and computer program modules forming part of the end product and
evaluating originality, authorship and ownership for them separately.
28 See Computer Edge (Pty) Ltd v Apple Computer Inc supra note 18, where theAustralian High Court held
that a program stored as electrical impulses on ROM chip was not an eligible work at all. This was rejected
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Apple Computer Inc v Mackintosh Computers Ltd [1990] 2 SCR 209 and
later overruled by Autodesk Inc v Dyason [1992] RPC 575 (HC of Aus).
29 For example, the layout of output data on a computer screen as argued in Pastel Software (Pty) Ltd v
Pink Software (Pty) Ltd supra note 21.
30 Section 2(2) of the Copyright Act includes representation in digital data or signals. See Northern Office
Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein supra note 26 where the program was stored on a ﬂoppy disc and
Golden China TV Game Centre v Nintendo Co Ltd supra note 22 where the input data and program were
stored on ROM chips. See also Metix (UK) Ltd v GH Maughan (Plastics) Ltd [1997] FSR 718 (Pat Ct).
31 Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (C) supra note 19 at 410; Tana Pistorius &
Coenraad Visser ‘The Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992 and computer programs: A preliminary
overview’ (1992) 4 SA Mercantile LJ 346 at 348, Dana van der Merwe ‘Copyright and computers, with
special reference to the internet’ (1998) 115 SALJ 180 at 191; Dean op cit note 16 at 1–14. Contrast Payen
Components SA Ltd v Bovic Gaskets CC 1994 (2) SA464 (W) at 472 which held that the ‘table of signiﬁcance’
used to develop the computer program that was in turn used to generate the list of gasket numbers ‘cannot
constitute a work since it was merely the outline of a new system, based on certain mathematical principles,
which was used . . . for devising a computer program’. This approach is clearly incorrect. Any material can
attract copyright in its own right, provided it meets all the eligibility criteria — in this case as a literary work.
Such copyright, once attained, cannot be lost simply because further development occurs. See Haupt t/a
Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (C) supra note 19, which held that a developmental version
of a program of which the core functionality was complete was protectable by copyright even though not
commercially available. See also Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group 2002 (4) SA248 (SCA) at 262.
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AUTHORSHIP
The Copyright Act deﬁnes the author of a computer program as being ‘the
person who exercised control over the making of the computer program’.32
The protection of computer programs as sui generis works is unique to
South Africa and this deﬁnition is similarly unique. The interpretation of the
deﬁnition is crucial, since it will often determine the ownership of copyright
in a computer program. Three possible situations can be identiﬁed: a
programmer writes a program while not being under any obligation to a
third party to do so; a programmer writes a program in fulﬁlment of his or
her obligations under an employment contract (locatio conductio oper-
arum); or a programmer writes a program in fulﬁlment of his or her
obligations to do so under a commission or contract for work (locatio
conductio operis).
In the ﬁrst situation, where the programmer is under no obligation to
write the program, the programmer is apparently in control of the making of
the program and will be the author thereof as well as the ﬁrst copyright
owner.33 In the second situation, where the programmer is employed, it is
generally not decisive who the author of the program is,34 because the ﬁrst
ownership of copyright in the work will tend to vest in the employer of the
programmer irrespective of who the author is.35 It is extremely likely that in
most cases the employer will, in any event, be the author of the program,
since it would be exercising ‘control’ over the employee’s actions as part of
the employment relationship.36 The real problem arises in the third situation,
where the programmer is commissioned to write the program, which also
happens to be the situation that occurs most often in practice.37
The Copyright Act does not make provision for the automatic ex lege
transfer of ﬁrst ownership of copyright in a computer program from the
author to the commissioning party.38 Furthermore, it is quite common for
such commissions to be oral in nature rather than written and, even where
32 Subsection (i) of the deﬁnition of ‘author’ in s 1.
33 In terms of s 21(1)(a) of the Copyright Act.
34 Except for the purposes of asserting moral rights in terms of s 20 of the Copyright Act.
35 If the employer is the author, the employer obtains copyright by way of s 21(1)(a) of the Copyright
Act, and if the employee is the author, the employer obtains copyright by way of s 21(1)(d). The only
exception is the vesting of copyright in accordance with an agreement made in terms of s 21(1)(e). See for
example Prism Holdings Ltd v Liversage 2001 BIP 114 (W) 118.
36 See Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (SCA) supra note 11 para 41, which states
that ‘‘‘control’’ in the deﬁnition [of author in respect of a computer program], must therefore have been
intended to have a wider meaning than ‘‘control’’ in the employment situation’. By these words Streicher JA
seems to imply that the control exercised by way of the employment contract will ordinarily be adequate to
vest authorship in the employer.
37 The scenario can occur in several different guises, for example, where a programmer forms part of a
team of independent programmers working together on the development of a computer program, or where
programmers or the businesses employing the programmers are instructed by a third party to develop a
computer program.
38 Computer programs are not named in the list of works in s 21(1)(c) of the Copyright Act in respect of
which such transfer can occur, and following cases such as Marais v Bezuidenhout 1999 (3) SA 988 (W) and
Nel v Ladismith Co-Operative Wine Makers and Distillers Ltd [2000] 3 All SA 367 (C) it is clear that s 21(1)(d)
can be used only for an employment contract. Ironically, cinematograph ﬁlms are listed in s 21(1)(c) and
could thus apply at least to the input ﬁles to video games after the decision in Golden China TV Game Centre
v Nintendo Co Ltd supra note 22.
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the commission is in writing, there is often no contractual clause regulating
the vesting of copyright in the commissioned computer program.39 This
means that the commissioning party will have to rely on the deﬁnition of
authorship to obtain initial copyright ownership in computer programs that
it has commissioned.40
It was commonly believed that the words ‘control over the making’would
be interpreted by the courts in a similar way to the words used to identify the
author of a computer-generated work, cinematograph ﬁlm or sound
recording. In those cases the author is the person who makes or undertakes
the arrangements necessary for the making of such a work.41 This approach
would mean that the person undertaking and controlling the physical
arrangements (as opposed to the mere ﬁnancial arrangements) for the making
of the computer program would qualify as the author.42 Such physical
arrangements could include obtaining assistance for the development of parts
of the ﬁnal work from third parties.43 Control over the physical making of
the program would thus be the key to authorship under this approach, with
less emphasis on ﬁnancial control. It is thus likely that someone who
commissions a computer program (‘the commissioner’) will ﬁnd it difﬁcult
to qualify as the author of that program, unless he does more than merely
commissioning the work and paying for it.
Here it is worth noting that the usual role of the commissioner in a
software development contract is to supply the computer programmer or
software house with a functional speciﬁcation outlining the functionality
that it requires from the software. During development of the programs the
commissioner would typically have meetings with the software developers to
monitor their progress against a project schedule and to suggest changes to
the functionality and user interfaces of the programs as they are being
developed. The question therefore becomes whether or not this type of
39 Transfer of copyright ownership must be in writing and signed by the assignor or licenser in terms of
s 22(3) of the Copyright Act. In this regard the proposition that copyright ownership can transfer to
someone who commissions a work by way of an oral or even tacit agreement in terms of s 21(1)(e) of the
Copyright Act must be rejected (see for example Freefall Trading 211 (Pty) Ltd v Proplink Publishing (Pty) Ltd
2005 (as yet unreported CPD case no 10491/05 decided on 29 November 2005) paras 15 and 16. Section
21(1)(e) clearly states that ss 21(1)(b), (c) and (d) ‘shall in any particular case have effect subject to any
agreement excluding the operation thereof’. The only effect s 21(1) (e) thus foresees is the exclusion by an
oral or tacit agreement of the effect of s 21(1)(b), (c) or (d) which transfer initial ownership of a copyright
work to someone other than the author thereof (as prescribed by s 21(1)(a)). In this regard it should be
noted that the operation of s 21(1)(a) cannot be excluded by such a tacit or oral agreement in terms of
s 21(1)(e).
40 See for example Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (C) supra note 19.
41 Dean op cit note 5 at 89.
42 See Nintendo v Golden China TV Game Centre Co Ltd supra note 12 at 242–3 from which it is clear that
the party making the physical arrangements is recognized as the author of a cinematograph ﬁlm. See also
Bamgboye v Reed [2004] EMLR 5 (QB) which determines the author by asking who the ‘moving force’was
behind the physical arrangements. See also Beggars Banquet Records Ltd v Carlton Television Ltd [1993] EMLR
349 (ChD) and A&M Records Ltd v Video Collection International Ltd [1995] EMLR 25 (ChD) for a different
perspective, where the ﬁnancial arrangements made for the commissioning of a work, and in particular the
payment of production costs, was considered sufﬁcient for the vesting of authorship. In this regard it should
be noted that the English Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 has no provision similar to s 21(1)(c) of
the South African Copyright Act and such absence apparently inﬂuenced these decisions.
43 Nintendo v Golden China TV Game Centre Co Ltd supra note 12 at 242.
COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND COPYRIGHT: THE SA PERSPECTIVE 321
contribution by the commissioner is sufﬁcient to make it the author or
co-author of the ﬁnal computer program.
It is clear that the commissioner’s intellectual input into the ﬁnal work is
generally extremely limited. The functional requirements could be com-
pared to a statement of requirements to an architect in which the
commissioner determines what type of rooms it requires in a house that it
wants the architect to design. Such contributions will ordinarily be
considered general ideas and would thus not vest authorship in the
commissioner if the work in question was a musical, literary or artistic
work.44 However, South Africa has chosen to protect computer programs as
a sui generis entrepreneurial work. Intellectual input is not a requirement for
authorship — control is.45 The amount of control that a commissioner
exercises over the making of a computer program will be a question of fact in
each case. Clearly the commissioner will be the ultimate ‘moving force’46
behind the making of the program, but, as indicated, it is generally not such a
force in a physical sense, but rather in a ﬁnancial sense. Control over the
physical writing process is mostly left to the programmer or manager of the
development team, subject to periodic review of their progress by the
commissioner. This approach would tend to suggest that the programmers or
software development house will, consistent with long held beliefs in the
software industry, be considered the author of the program.47
In Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd48 the test for
control was, however, set out by Erasmus J as follows:
‘[T]he person who exercises control over the making of a computer program is a person who has the
power of regulation of the manner in which the person who ‘‘makes’’ the program is to do his or her
work. ‘‘Control’’ in this context does not, in my view, mean that the person who exercises control must
be able to instruct the programmer as to technical detail. Control means setting the purpose and requirements
that that the program to be made must satisfy, and evaluating the work of the person that ‘‘makes’’ the
program to ensure that the requirements are met and that the program is functional and capable of fulﬁlling
the stated purpose.’49
Erasmus J then proceeds to ﬁnd that the commissioning company through its
employees were in control of the making of the computer program
developed by the commissioned programmer, since they provided the
functional requirements and periodically reviewed his progress.50 This
approach by Erasmus J can be considered revolutionary. If accepted, it
44 See for example Pan African Engineers v Hydro Tube 1972 (1) SA 470 (W) which held that the
contributor of ideas was not a co-author.
45 Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (C) supra note 19 at 412.
46 Bamgboye v Reed [2004] EMLR 5 (QB).
47 See for example Logistics Network (Pty) Ltd v Hard & Software Systems CC 1999 BIP 278 (C) where a
commissioner’s claim to authorship in respect of a computer program was refused, consistent with industry
practice. See also the allegations of the respondent computer programmers repeated by Schreuder AJ in
Lacfin (Pty) Ltd v Le Roux 769 JOC (O) at 774–5 and the decision in Fylde Microsystems Ltd v Key Radio
Systems Ltd [1998] FSR 449.
48 Supra note 19.
49 At 416 (emphasis added).
50 Interestingly, Erasmus J seemingly fails to apply his own test later on in the judgment at 420 when
deciding on authorship in the software after further development post 1 July 1998, but instead refers to
English authority where the deﬁnition of authorship is clearly different since computer programs are
viewed as literary works.
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effectively transfers ownership in a vast number of computer programs
developed in this country. The consequence will be the invalidation of
existing licences granted in the belief of copyright ownership and large-scale
infringement of intellectual property rights. In addition, the treatment of
customized versions of standard computer programs that are created by a
developer based on each customer’s speciﬁc requirements will become a
copyright nightmare if not regulated by written agreement. The developer
will clearly own the copyright in the original standardized version of the
program, but according to the approach of Erasmus J each customer could
potentially be author of its own derivative customized version of the
program and thus own the copyright therein. Potentially each customer can
thus start competing with the software developer, unless it is contractually
prevented from doing so. The result of the approach by Erasmus J can thus
only be described as a commercial disaster and cannot be recommended.
Streicher JA in Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd
does not expressly reject the approach of Erasmus J, but instead deﬁnes ‘to
control’ and ‘control’ by referring to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as
meaning ‘to exercise restraint or direction upon the free action of’ and ‘the
fact of controlling, or checking and directing action’.51 Streicher JA then
evaluates the relationship between the commissioner and the contractor as
follows in order to establish whether the requisite ‘control’ was exercised by
the commissioner:
‘In this case Haupt instructed Coetzee as to the end result that was to be achieved, Coetzee then did the
technical work required to achieve that end result and from time to time effected improvements.
However, Coetzee was all along in constant contact with Haupt and he accepted and executed detailed
instructions from Haupt. As he progressed he submitted his work to Haupt for it to be checked and approved by
him. In the properties section of the Data Explorer program Coetzee indicated that the copyright was
owned by Softcopy, the name under which Haupt was trading. The allegation by Haupt in his founding
afﬁdavit that it was always agreed between the parties that Haupt was the owner of the program was not
disputed. This being the understanding between the parties, Haupt could at any time direct in which
direction the development of the program should proceed or could terminate further development if he
wished to do so. Haupt was, therefore, in a position of authority over Coetzee insofar as the development of
the program was concerned. He was in command and Coetzee subjected himself to such command. It is
true that Haupt was in no position to instruct Coetzee as to how, technically, to achieve his requirements but
I agree with the High Court that one does not need to be a computer programmer to be able to control
the writing of a computer program. For these reasons I am of the view that Haupt controlled the writing
of the computer programs written after 31 July 1998.’52
It seems clear from these words of Streicher JA that a commissioner will
not be seen to be in ‘control’ by merely instructing a contractor as to the end
result required from it and then evaluating such end result to see whether or
not its requirements have been met. The judgment appears to require
considerably more — namely an element of control over the actual physical
arrangements for the writing of the program by the programmer. The
continuous involvement of the commissioner in the development process,
the detailed instructions given by the commissioner as to the writing of the
51 Para 41.
52 Ibid (my emphasis).
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program and the position of authority of the commissioner with regard to
the development process are emphasized by Streicher JA and all point
towards such an approach.
The decision of Streicher JA should be welcomed. As stated above, the
mere provision of functional requirements, periodic reviewing of the
progress made by the developers, and testing of the ﬁnal program to evaluate
whether the requirements have been met, without more, should be
insufﬁcient to establish control over the making of the program or to vest
authorship therein. As stated by Streicher JA, the commissioner does not
have to give detailed technical instructions to establish the requisite ‘control’,
but it seems clear that at least some form of control over the physical
arrangements for the actual technical development and writing of the
program will be required.
ORIGINALITY
Computer programs have to be original to qualify for copyright protection.53
It is trite law that originality requires the expenditure of individual
intellectual effort in the form of labour, skill or judgement and that the work
must be more than a mere slavish copy.54 Provided such effort is expended,
however, it is quite possible to create original derivative works that make use
of existing material, including existing copyright works. 55 The Copyright
Act even makes it clear that infringement of an existing work by a second
work does not as such prevent such second work from being original.56
Generally computer programs have little problem in being recognized as
original, because of the effort expended in creating them. It can be argued
that such effort should relate to the control over the making of the program,
since it is such control that vests authorship, in which case very little effort
will be required for originality.57 However, the courts seem to follow the
traditional approach. Erasmus J in Haupt58 states it as follows: ‘The originality
of a computer program, and its eligibility for copyright, would therefore
depend upon the question whether sufﬁcient original skill and labour were
used in the creation of the program.’59
53 Section 2(1) of the Copyright Act.
54 Klep Valves (Pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co Ltd 1987 (2) SA 1 (A).
55 Ibid.
56 Section 2(3).
57 The deﬁnition of the author of a computer program is signiﬁcant. Whereas the author of a literary
work is the person who ‘makes or creates’ the work, the author of a computer program is the person who
‘exercised control over the making’ thereof. As stated by Dean op cit note 16 at 1–22, ‘the author or maker
of a work is the cornerstone of copyright law’. It is thus arguable that the deﬁnition of an ‘author’ gives an
indication of the type of effort that is protectable by copyright depending on the nature of the work,
because it deﬁnes the type of effort in each case that vests authorship. For a literary work, the effort spent in
creating or making the work can thus be argued to be protectable, whereas for a computer program the
effort spent in controlling the making of the program is arguably the effort worth protecting. A full
discussion of this argument is, however, beyond the scope of this article.
58 Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (C) supra note 19 at 412. See also Haupt t/a
Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (SCA) supra note 11 paras 35 and 36.
59 See also Lacfin (Pty) Ltd v Le Roux supra note 47 at 778–9.
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A modiﬁed version of a computer program is nothing but a derivative
version thereof that should of itself be original, provided it is to an extent the
product of the author’s own labour, skill or judgement.60 The following
statement by Erasmus J in Haupt61 should therefore be approached with
caution:
‘The applicant may have expended time, effort, skill and expense on improving and reﬁning the
software. It is, however, necessary to have regard to what the time and effort was expended on. The
time and effort was devoted to making changes to a program, the copyright of which at all times vested
in the ﬁrst respondent. By expending time and effort on the improvement of the program, the applicant
did not, in some way, become the holder of the copyright.’ 62
While the statement is entirely true in respect of the unmodiﬁed initial
version of the computer program, the same cannot be said for the modiﬁed
version of the program that is created as a result of the changes.63 It is
apparent that the applicant’s creation of such a derivative computer program
in this case may well have amounted to an infringement of the copyright
held by the respondent, but, as indicated above,64 such infringement is
irrelevant in determining whether or not the derivative program is in fact
original. In reality, the type of effort expended by the applicant appears to be
exactly the type that would create an original computer program, provided
sufﬁcient skill, labour and judgement was expended in making the
modiﬁcations.65 Erasmus J attempts to clarify his statement when he
continues:
‘It is not the applicant’s case that one (or more) of the developments that occurred after 31 July 1998,
and of which he was author, satisﬁed the originality requirement of theAct and attracted copyright in its
own right. . . . The applicant’s case is simply that he (applicant) is the holder of the copyright in the
converter program as part of the Data Explorer ‘‘package’’.’66
The Supreme Court of Appeal found that Erasmus J erred when making
this statement.67 In this regard it should also be remembered that the
originality of a work should be judged by reference to the whole of the work
and not by reference to its separate parts, although some parts of the work
will contribute more to the originality of the work as a whole (eg the newly
created parts) than other parts (eg the previously existing, copied or
60 Klep Valves (Pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co Ltd supra note 54. See also Northern Office Micro Computers
(Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein supra note 26, which states that the application of the effort and skill must give the
work a ‘new and original character’. New in this respect should not be interpreted as absolute novelty as is
required to make an invention patentable, but merely as being different from the original character.
61 Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (C) supra note 19.
62 At 419. In contrast, Erasmus J, in a later part of his judgment, at 422–3, stated that the computer
program was not protected by the Copyright Act at all and in fact fell into the public domain allowing
anyone to copy it. This apparently conﬂicting ﬁnding is frankly incomprehensible. There is no doubt that
the computer program was eligible for copyright. It was only the authorship and ownership thereof that
were ever really in dispute and these aspects were settled in favour of the respondent by Erasmus J. The fact
that the respondent owned the copyright and not the applicant simply cannot mean that the work is not
protected by the Copyright Act at all. It simply means that the respondent is entitled to the copyright
protection that the applicant was wrongly claiming for himself.
63 Note that the respondent no longer exercised any form of control over the applicant during the
making of the modiﬁed version.
64 In section II (3).
65 In Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (SCA) supra note 11 para 24 Streicher JA
expressly rejects the approach by Erasmus J and ﬁnds the ﬁnal computer program to be original at 36. Also
see IBCOS Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd supra note 14 at 293–4.
66 At 419.
67 Per Streicher JA in Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (SCA) supra note 11 para
25.
COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND COPYRIGHT: THE SA PERSPECTIVE 325
commonplace parts).68 Unless the converter program was argued to be an
entirely separate copyright work from the remainder of the Data Explorer
package,69 it was not possible for the applicant to claim that he was holder of
the copyright in the derivative work, since the whole thereof can be original
provided sufﬁcient protectable effort has been spent on modifying it.70 It
would not have been proper to claim originality in parts of the derivative
work only. The applicant consequently simply had to allege facts from which
a conclusion could be drawn that his effort in changing the program was
sufﬁcient for the changed version to be original and that he was the owner of
copyright in such derivative program.71
INFRINGEMENT
South Africa is in the unique position that, contrary to the express
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement,72 it has chosen to protect computer
programs as a sui generis work rather than a literary work. It is thus important
to keep in mind that the South African legislature has clearly recognized that
different considerations apply to computer programs than to literary works.73
Nonetheless, prior to the CopyrightAmendmentAct 1992, SouthAfrica was
one of the ﬁrst countries in the world to protect computer programs as
literary works and case law dealing with literary works thus remain of some
import to computer programs.74
Scope of protection
The speciﬁc exclusive rights granted to the holder of copyright in a
computer program are listed in the Copyright Act75 and include exclusive
reproduction and adaptation rights.76 The limitations on these exclusive
rights are contained in the exceptions to infringement in the Copyright
68 See Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group supra 257 stating: ‘Under the Act the inquiry is
whether the ‘‘work’’ . . . was original. The inquiry is not whether its parts are original.’ See also the
submissions of Dean op cit note 16 at 1–16.
69 The court, however, did not separate the components of the Data Explorer package into separate
programs, but instead treated the package as a single copyright work. If the converter program had been
dealt with as a separate work, it would be entirely correct to state that the creation of a new work does not
transfer copyright in another already existing work.
70 The converter program was in fact one of the modiﬁcations made after 31 July 1998.
71 Video Rent (Pty) Ltd v Flamingo Film Hire 1981 (3) SA 42 (C). It could be argued that the applicant’s
problems did not arise from a lack of originality or ownership of the Data Explorer program, but rather from
the fact that the respondent did not copy any part of the Data Explorer program that vested such originality
in the applicant (being the changes made after 31 July 1998), since the respondent only copied those parts of
the program which were developed by the applicant while employed by the respondent (the so-called
Project AMPS prototype program as at 31 July 1998) and in respect of which the respondent thus in fact
held the copyright in terms of the decision.
72 Article 10(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994
(TRIPS Agreement).
73 A full discussion of the merits of this approach unfortunately falls outside the scope of this article.
74 Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein supra note 26 and Econostat (Pty) Ltd v Lambrecht
supra note 11.
75 Section 11B. See also s 23(2) and s 27 for secondary infringement and criminal infringement.
76 Section 1 states that ‘adaptation’ includes a version of the program in a different programming
language, notation or code. This would include the source code version of a program in object code.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL326
Act.77 In addition, the Copyright Act provides that any reference in it to the
doing of an act in relation to a work has to be construed as a reference to the
doing of an act in relation to a substantial part of such work.78 Between them
these provisions deﬁne the most important parts of the scope of copyright
protection for computer programs.
The very limited technical copyright exceptions in s 19B(2) of the
Copyright Act stand in stark contrast to ss 50A, 50B, 50BA and 50C read
with s 296A of the English Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.79
Section 19B(2) allows the making of back-up copies for private and personal
purposes only, whereas s 50A has no such limitation. In addition, s 50C
allows changes for the purposes of error correction, s 50B allows decompi-
lation for the purposes of interoperability80 and s 50BA allows the reverse
engineering of a computer program.81 Section 296Amakes any contractual term
void that seeks to avoid the operation of ss 50A, 50B or 50BA. These additional
exceptions in the English Act are clearly designed to stimulate competition and
further development and to prevent unwarranted monopolies.82 The United
States courts have used the ﬂexible ‘fair use’ exemption83 to similar effect, but go
even further by allowing decompilation for the purposes of understanding the
ideas and functional elements contained in the program by holding ‘where
disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements
embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate
reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work,
as a matter of law’.84
The English, European and United States approach to the copyright
exemptions thus all show a tendency to limit the scope of protection for
computer programs, because they recognize that computer programs are
essentially utilitarian or functional in nature as opposed to most other
copyright works.85 The granting of a monopoly for a computer program will




79 See also ss 47B, 47C, 47D, 47E, 47F read with s 47H in the Australian Copyright Act 1968.
80 See Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd [2000] ECDR 99 which declined to extend the defence to
decompilation for the purposes of repair or error correction.
81 Reverse engineering generally refers to a ‘black box’method of establishing the inner functioning of a
computer program without actually investigating the program code, by simply analysing the output data of
the computer program.
82 See also arts 5 and 6 of Council Directive (EEC) No 91/250 of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of
computer programs.
83 The fair use defence is found in 17 USC § 107 which reads as follows: ‘[T]he fair use of a copyrighted
work . . . is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include (1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonproﬁt educational purposes; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.’
84 Sony Computer Entertainment v Connectix Corp 203 F 3d 596 (9th Cir 2000) and Sega Enterprises Ltd v
Accolade Inc 977 F 2d 1514 (9th Cir 1993) 1527–8.
85 The exception would be the copyright protection of utilitarian design materials which are similarly
limited by the exemption in South Africa by s 15(3A) of the Copyright Act.
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The exemptions also reﬂect some of the primary concerns with respect to
the copyright monopoly in computer programs. First, the exemptions
recognize that the method of storage of a program is transient and may easily
be interfered with. A lawful user should therefore be allowed to make at least
one back-up copy allowing it to restore the original program. There is no
apparent reason why this approach should be limited to private or personal
use, because it may effectively require a business to repurchase a licence for
the program on each occasion of interference with its installed copy.
Secondly, the right of a lawful user to correct errors reﬂect the concern
that a user may purchase a licence to a computer program that does not
function properly, but copyright prevents such user from correcting the
errors in the program that would render it fully functional. Thirdly, the
exemption for reverse engineering recognizes that the ideas and functional
elements of a computer program should not be monopolized.
Finally, the exemption for interoperability recognizes that it would unduly
restrict competition if the copyright monopoly prevented all decompi-
lation,86 because it would prevent development of computer programs able
to interoperate or function in conjunction with an existing program. It
should be noted once again that it requires time and effort for computer users
to familiarize themselves with computer programs. Such time and effort
involve cost considerations for computer users, making it difﬁcult for such
users to change to a new program. Once a computer program is thus
established in the market, it is extremely difﬁcult, if not impossible, to
displace.87 Competitors of the copyright holder of such an established
program will thus tend to develop programs that work in conjunction with
the established program rather than attempt to compete directly with it.
Principles of infringement
The locus classicus for copyright infringement in South African law remains
Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus.88 Corbett JA, relying on English law,89
held the test for infringement to be as follows:
‘[I]n order for there to have been an infringement of the copyright in an original work it must be shown
(i) that there is sufﬁcient objective similarity between the alleged infringing work and the original work,
or a substantial part thereof, for the former to be properly described, not necessarily as identical with, but
as a reproduction or copy of the latter; and (ii) that the original work was the source from which the
alleged infringing work was derived, i e that there is a causal connection between the original work and
the alleged infringing work . . .’90
The second leg of the test of Corbett JA is relatively uncontroversial. It is
recognized that direct evidence of the causal connection is often difﬁcult to
ﬁnd, but the courts have consistently held that a causal connection has to be
proven on a balance of probabilities in the light of all the relevant
86 Since it would infringe on the exclusive adaptation right.
87 For example, the Microsoft Windows operating system.
88 1989 (1) SA 276 (A).
89 Francis Day & Hunter Ltd v Bron [1963] Ch 587.
90 At 280.
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circumstances, including direct evidence, opportunity to access the original
work, and the objective similarities between the original work and the
alleged infringing work.91 Similarities in respect of unique, arbitrary or
non-standard features, and similar mistakes or redundant code would be
more convincing evidence of a causal connection than standard or
commonplace features.92
The ﬁrst leg of the test of Corbett JA is however problematic. Its wording
has led to subsequent case law evaluating substantiality by not only looking at
the similarities between the original work and the alleged infringing work,
but also the dissimilarities.93 This approach is unfortunate and inconsistent
with the Copyright Act, which prohibits certain acts in respect of a
substantial part of the original work only and thus prevents derivation rather
than the creation of confusing or deceptive similarities in appearance.94 In
Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd95 Lord Millet addresses the
same problem encountered in the English courts, and his approach deserves
to be quoted in full:
‘The Court ofAppeal began by making a visual comparison of the two designs. Their initial reaction was
that it did not look as if the defendants’ design involved the copying of a substantial part of the copyright
work.As Morritt LJ put it at para 30: ‘‘On the broadest level they just do not look sufﬁciently similar. . .’’
[b]ut I think that the Court of Appeal erred in principle in the approach which they adopted. In
particular, I think that they misunderstood the function of a visual comparison of the two works in a case
concerned with artistic copyright and the stage at which such a comparison should be undertaken.
It must be borne in mind that this is an action for infringement of copyright. It is not an action for
passing-off. The gist of an action for passing off is deceptive resemblance. The defendant is charged with
deceiving the public into taking his goods as and for the goods of the plaintiff. A visual comparison of the
competing articles is often all that is required. If the overall impression is that ‘‘they just do not look
sufﬁciently similar’’ then the action will fail. An action for infringement of artistic copyright, however, is
very different. It is not concerned with the appearance of the defendant’s work but with its derivation.
The copyright owner does not complain that the defendant’s work resembles his, his complaint is that
the defendant has copied all or a substantial part of the copyright work. The reproduction may be exact
or it may introduce deliberate variations, involving, for example, altered copying or colourable
imitation as it is sometimes called. Even where the copying is exact, the defendant may incorporate the
copied features into a larger work, much and perhaps most of which is original or derived from other
sources. But while the copied features must be a substantial part of the copyright work, they need not
form a substantial part of the defendant’s work. Thus the overall appearance of the defendant’s work may
be very different from the copyright work, but it does not follow that the defendant’s work does not
infringe the plaintiff’s copyright.
The ﬁrst step in an action for infringement of artistic copyright is to identify those features of the
defendant’s design which the plaintiff alleges have been copied from the copyright work. The court
undertakes a visual comparison of the two designs, noting the similarities and the differences. The
purpose of the examination is not to see whether the overall appearance of the two designs is similar, but
to judge whether the particular similarities relied on are sufﬁciently close, numerous or extensive to be
more likely to be the result of copying than of coincidence. It is at this stage that similarities may be
disregarded because they are commonplace, unoriginal, or consist of general ideas. If the plaintiff
91 Dexion Europe Ltd v Universal Storage Systems (Pty) Ltd 2003 (1) SA 31 (SCA). For the position in
England, see IBCOS Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance supra note 14 at 296–301. For a
contrasting position in the United States, see Computer Associates International Inc v Altai Inc supra note 21,
where it was held that causal connection is proven by either direct evidence or access and substantial
objective similarity.
92 Jacana Education (Pty) Ltd v Frandsen Publishers (Pty) Ltd 1998 (2) SA 965 (SCA), IBCOS Computers Ltd
v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd supra note 14 at 297–301.
93 See for example Jacana Education (Pty) Ltd v Frandsen Publishers (Pty) Ltd supra note 92.
94 Section 1(2A).
95 2001 FSR 11 (HL).
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demonstrates sufﬁcient similarity, not in the works as a whole but in the features which he alleges have
been copied, and establishes that the defendant had prior access to the copyright work, the burden passes
to the defendant to satisfy the judge that, despite the similarities, they did not result from copying. Even
at this stage, therefore, the inquiry is directed to the similarities rather than the differences. This is not to
say that the differences are unimportant. They may indicate an independent source and so rebut any
inference of copying, but differences in the overall appearance of the two works due to the presence of
features of the defendant’s work about which no complaint is made are not material.
Once the judge has found that the defendants’ design incorporates features taken from the copyright
work, the question is whether what has been taken constitutes all or a substantial part of the copyright
work. This is a matter of impression, for whether the part taken is substantial must be determined by its
quality rather than its quantity. It depends upon its importance to the copyright work. It does not
depend upon its importance to the defendants’ work, as I have already pointed out. The pirated part is
considered on its own and its importance to the copyright work assessed. There is no need to look at the
infringing work for this purpose.’96
This approach of Lord Millet can apply equally to all other types of works,
including computer programs. It is clear that the order of the two legs of the
test of Corbett JA in Galago Publishers should be reversed. In the ﬁrst place, it
is necessary to determine which parts of the alleged infringing work have
been causally derived from the original work and, once that is established,
the court must decide if the totality of those parts forms a substantial part of
the original copyright work.97
Deciding whether the parts of a work which have been found to be
reproduced embody a substantial part of the original work is probably one of
the most difﬁcult questions in copyright law. In Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd v
Erasmus98 Corbett JA refers with approval to the oft-quoted English
judgment of Lord Reid in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football)
Ltd99 and holds that substantiality ‘depends much more on the quality than
on the quantity’ of what has been taken. These words have been repeated
with monotonous regularity by the SouthAfrican courts, but they have been
less than clear in stating what the word ‘quality’ actually relates to.100
The English courts recently addressed this issue. In Designers Guild Ltd v
Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd101 Lord Scott quoted with approval the test
proposed by Laddie, Prescott & Vittoria102 which asks: ‘Has the infringer
incorporated a substantial part of the independent skill, labour etc.
contributed by the original author in creating the copyright work. . .?’
In Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks & Spencer103 Lord Hoffmann
described it in the following way:
‘But what quality is one looking for? The question, as it seems to me, must be answered by reference to
the reason why the work is given copyright protection. In literary copyright, for example, copyright is
96 At 34–41.
97 See also Lord Hoffmann in Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd supra note 95 at 17–22.
98 1989 (1) SA 276 (A) at 285.
99 [1964] 1 All ER 465 (HL).
100 See for example Fax Directories (Pty) Ltd v SA Fax Listings CC 1990 (2) SA 164 (D), from which it is
apparent that the court regards quality as relating to the monetary value of the parts taken.
101 Supra note 95 at 64.
102 The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs 2 ed (1995) para 2–108.
103 [2002] RPC 4.
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conferred (irrespective of literary merit) upon an original literary work. It follows that the quality
relevant for the purposes of substantiality is the literary originality of that which has been copied . . . [i]t
is in this context that one must ask whether there has been copying of sufﬁcient of the relevant skill and
labour to constitute a substantial part . . .’104
From these decisions it is thus clear that the quality of a part of a copyright
work relates to the skill, labour and judgement expended in making or
creating such part of the work that contributes to making the copyright work
as a whole original.105 It should also be the correct type of skill, labour and
judgement, in that in a literary work, for example, it contributes literary
originality (as opposed to, for example, artistic originality).106 Furthermore it
must be the type of labour, skill and judgement which gives the work ‘a new
and original character’107 or ‘impart[s] to the product some quality or
character which the raw material did not possess, and which differentiates the
product from the raw material’.108
Lord Hoffmann in Newspaper Licensing Agency109 had no hesitation in
applying these principles to a published edition and they should be equally
applicable to computer programs in the South African context.110 To some
extent the Supreme Court of Appeal seems to appreciate that quality relates
to labour, skill and judgement when it found sixty-three lines of program
code out of several thousand lines to be a substantial part, since the lines were
copied because the programmer of the infringing program ‘found it too
difﬁcult to write them himself’.111 The question therefore becomes: does the
totality of the parts of the computer program that was taken for use in the
alleged infringing program represent a substantial part of the right type of
labour, skill and judgement expended to make the ﬁrst program original?112
It is often said that there is no copyright in ideas, thoughts or facts, but
only in the expression thereof, and consequently that the copying of
expression is required for copyright infringement. Whereas this statement
104 At 19.
105 This is not a new proposition as can be seen from the words from Lord Pearce in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd
v William Hill (Football) Ltd supra note 99 when he states: ‘Whether a part is substantial must be decided by
its quality rather than its quantity. The reproduction of a part which by itself has no originality will not
normally be a substantial part of the copyright and therefore will not be protected.’
106 See Interlego v Tyco 1988 (3) All ER 949, and Lord Hoffmann in Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams
(Textiles) Ltd supra note 95 at 25 and Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks & Spencer Plc supra note 103 at
19–21.
107 Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein supra note 26 at 130.
108 Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd [2000] RPC 95 (ChD) 132.
109 [2002] RPC 4.
110 The applicability of these principles in the South African context is also supported by Corbett JA in
Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus supra note 88 at 284 when he quotes the following words with approval
from Ravenscroft v Herbert [1980] RPC 193: ‘Copyright protects the skill and labour employed by the
plaintiff in production of his work.’
111 Per Streicher JA in Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (SCA) supra note 11 para
45. The Court also implies that quality may relate to the contribution made to the functioning of the
program by the relevant sections of code when it says that ‘[t]hese components were clearly considered to
be a valuable ingredient of the program by both [the applicant] and the respondents’. Such an approach to
‘quality’ is clearly inconsistent with the English decisions referred to above.
112 In the case of the entrepreneurial works, such as a computer program, it could be argued that such
labour, skill and judgment is not necessarily expended by the author, because the author is often not the
person actually making the work. See the text to note 51.
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generally holds true for copyright in the United States,113 the same cannot be
said for England114 or South Africa. Corbett JA115 rightly criticizes this
statement as an over-simpliﬁcation by referring to English authorities116
which state:
‘Ideas, thoughts and facts merely existing in a man’s brain are not ‘‘works’’, and in that form are not
within the Copyright Act; but once reduced to writing or other material form the result may be a work
susceptible to protection. Given that there exists a good copyright in a work, the law does not protect a
general idea or concept which underlies the work, nor any one fact or piece of information contained
therein. However, a more detailed collection of ideas, or pattern of incidents, or compilation of
information may amount to such a substantial part of the work that to take it would be an infringement
of the copyright, although expressed in different language or other form, it being a matter of fact and
degree whether the dividing line has been impermissibly crossed.’
The English117 and South African118 courts have also been much more
inclined to protect the merely functional than their United States119
counterparts, even where the expression protected was effectively the only
form in which the idea could be expressed.120 The functional nature of a
work has even been allowed to inﬂuence the evaluation of substantiality in
England, in that it was held that the substantiality of the parts reproduced
from an engineering drawing was to be evaluated by an engineer who would
clearly be able to recognize their functional importance despite those parts
being visually insigniﬁcant to a layman.121
Infringement of computer programs
South Africa’s only judgment of any signiﬁcance on the evaluation of the
meaning of a ‘substantial part’ in respect of computer programs is the case of
Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd,122 where the issue
was dealt with in a rather perfunctory manner by the Supreme Court of
113 Following Baker v Selden 101 US 99 (1879). See also Rosenthal v Kalpakian 446 F 2d 738 (1971).
114 See the judgment of Lord Hoffmann in Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd supra note
95 23–26; IBCOS Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd supra note 14 at 301–2.
115 Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus supra note 88 at 283–4.
116 Laddie, Prescott & Vittoria op cit note note 102 at 33.
117 See for example the protection of a grid layout for a competition in Express Newspaper v Liverpool Daily
Post [1985] 3 All ER 680; and the protection of computer data ﬁle deﬁnitions in IBCOS Computers Ltd v
Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd supra note 14.
118 See for example, the protection of a list of gasket numbers in Payen Components SA Ltd v Bovic Gaskets
CC supra note 31; a list of telephone numbers in Fax Directories (Pty) Ltd v SA Fax Listings CC supra note
100, a directory of vehicle speciﬁcations in Metro Polis t/a Transactive (Pty) Ltd v Naidoo t/a African Products
759 JOC (T) and a compilation of contact details in Human Sciences Research Council v Dictum Publishers (Pty)
Ltd 804 JOC (T). Contrast Waylite Diaries CC v First National Bank Ltd 1995 (1) SA 645 (A) where
copyright for a diary was refused, because it was held to be commonplace in its entirety.
119 Computer Asociates International Inc v Altai Inc supra note 21; Feist Publications v Rural Telephone 111 S Ct
1282 (1991).
120 See also Data Access Corp v Powerflex Services (Pty) Ltd supra note 10 at 24–5 in which the Australian
High Court recognizes that the protection of a computer program requires the protection of the functional
and sees it as a departure from the traditional principles of copyright stated in Autodesk Inc v Dyason supra
note 28 at 582 to be ‘when the expression of an idea is inseparable from its function, it forms part of the idea
and is not entitled to the protection of copyright’.
121 Billhofer Maschinenfabrik GmbH v TH Dixon & Co Ltd [1990] FSR 105 (ChD). For a contrary approach
see Johnstone Safety Ltd v Peter Cook (Int) plc [1990] FSR 161 (CA).
122 Supra note 11.
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Appeal.123 Judges worldwide tend to avoid deciding the issue, looking for
short cuts or leaving it to experts to decide. The shortcut used most often is
the ‘look and feel approach’ in terms of which a ﬁnding is made as to the
reproduction of the code of a computer program based on the similarities of
the output data of the programs.124 Another shortcut used by the courts is to
say that any part of the code of a computer program is substantial, because
without it the program would not be able to function correctly.125
Two distinctly opposite approaches to copyright infringement in com-
puter programs emerge from the United States126 and England,127 despite an
early attempt to import the United States approach into English law.128 The
conﬂict between the two approaches derives by and large from the
differences in protection granted to ideas and functional elements of works as
described above.
The modern United States approach129 to the determination of substanti-
ality originates from Computer Associates International Inc v Altai Inc130 and is
known as the ‘AFC-test’, where the acronym stands for Abstraction —
Filtration — Comparison. In terms of this test the court ﬁrst breaks down the
original program into its constituent structural parts at the appropriate
different levels of abstraction. The court then separates and removes all the
parts of the original program not worthy or suitable for copyright protection
and thus not suitable for being considered for the purposes of evaluating
substantiality. Finally, the remaining kernel of protectable expression or
‘golden nugget’ is compared to the alleged infringing work to determine
whether or not a substantial part thereof was taken.
123 Streicher JA found that 63 lines of code from a program containing several thousand lines were a
substantial part because they were qualitatively important. He based his ﬁnding of quality on the fact that
the programmer of the infringing program found the lines too difﬁcult to write himself and because they
were ‘considered to be a valuable ingredient of the program’ by all parties concerned. (See para 45 of the
judgment.)
124 This approach is rejected in Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (C) supra note 19
at 411. See also Thrustcode Ltd v WW Computing Ltd [1983] FSR 502 at 505 where Megarry V-C puts it as
follows: ‘[W]here, as here, the claim is to copyright in the program itself, the results produced by operating
the program must not be confused with the program in which the copyright is claimed. If I may take an
absurdly simple example, 2 and 2 make 4. But so does 2 times 2, or 6 minus 2, or 2 percent of 200, or 6
squared divided by 9, or many other things. Many different processes may produce the same answer and yet
remain different processes that have not been copied one from another.’
125 In Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd supra note 108 at 131 Pumfrey J rejects this type
of argument made in Autodesk Inc v Dyason supra note 28 and Autodesk Inc v Dyason [No 2] [1993] RPC 259
(HC of Aus) since overruled in Data Access Corp v Powerflex Services (Pty) Ltd supra note 10 at 77–87.
126 Computer Asociates International Inc v Altai Inc supra note 21; Gates Rubber Co v Bando Chemical Industries
Ltd 9 F 3d 823.
127 IBCOS Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd supra note 14; Cantor Fitzgerald
International v Tradition (UK) Ltd supra note 108.
128 John Richardson Computers v Flanders [1993] FSR 497.
129 Older United States cases tended to follow the much criticized decision in Whelan Associates v Jaslow
Dental Laboratory Inc 797 F 2d 1222 at 1236, holding that ‘[t]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work
would be the work’s idea and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be
expression of the idea. Where there are various ways of expressing an idea, then the particular means chosen
is not necessary to the purpose; hence there is expression, not idea.’ This clearly provides very wide
copyright protection for computer programs. The Whelan approach was widely criticized in the United
States as being anti-competitive in that it granted protection similar to a patent.
130 Supra note 21.
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The different levels of abstraction have been held to be the program’s main
purpose, the program structure or architecture, the program modules, the
program’s algorithms and data structures, the source code and the object
code.131 Whereas the program’s main purpose would clearly be a general idea
that is not protectable by copyright, the coding of the program would be an
expression that could, in principle, be protectable by copyright. The
protection of levels of abstraction other than the source or object code is
more difﬁcult to assess. These so-called ‘non-literal elements’ of the
program132 are often described as the program’s structure, sequence and
organization and can include things such as the general program structure as
it may appear in a ﬂow chart, the organization of intermodular relationships,
the parameters used and macro command structures.133 The ‘look and feel’ of
the program could also form part of the non-literal elements of the program,
in particular, in the structure, sequencing and organisation of the user
interfaces. However, as remarked in Computer Associates,134 the audiovisual
displays forming part of the user interfaces can be regarded as distinct works
and their appearance, in particular, should thus not form part of the
protectable elements of the computer program itself.
The purpose of ﬁltration is to ensure ‘that non-protectable technical
expression remains in the public domain for others to use freely as building
blocks in their own work’.135 For this reason the courts eliminate certain
parts of computer programs from the scope of protection, namely ideas,
processes, facts, public domain information, merger material, scénes à faire
material, and other unprotectable elements suggested by the particular facts
of the program under examination.136 Merged material is expression of an
idea that can be expressed in a very limited number of ways. In such cases the
‘merger doctrine’ dictates that the expression merges with the idea and
becomes unprotectable.137 Scénes à faire material is expression that is either
rudimentary, commonplace, indispensable, or standard to the idea being
expressed or are otherwise dictated by external factors.138 These parts of the
expression are simply equated to ideas and are therefore not protectable.139
Finally, once the court has ﬁltered out all the unprotectable elements only
a kernel of protectable expression remains that is compared to the alleged
infringing work to determine whether or not a substantial part thereof was
131 Gates Rubber Co v Bando Chemical Industries Ltd supra note 126.
132 For a more detailed discussion on these elements see Tumbraegel & De Villiers op cit note 14 and
Julian Velasco ‘The copyrightability of non-literal elements of computer programs’ (1994) 94 Columbia LR
242.
133 Computer Asociates International Inc v Altai Inc supra note 21.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid at 721.
136 Gates Rubber Co v Bando Chemical Industries Ltd supra note 126.
137 Morrissey v Proctor & Gamble, 379 F 2d 675, Lotus Development Corp v Paperback Software International,
740 F Supp 37.
138 Atari Inc v North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp 672 F 2d 607 (7th Cir) (1982), Reed-Union
Corp v Turtle Wax Inc 77 F 3d 909 (7th Cir) (1996), Williams v Crichton 84 F 3d 581 (2nd Cir) (1996).
139 Whelan Associates v Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc supra note 129, Donald S Chisum & Michael A Jacobs
Understanding Intellectual Property Law (1992) 4–30.
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taken. The United States approach is clearly aimed at fostering competition
and furthering development by giving limited protection to functional
expression.140
The approach of the English courts to the evaluation of substantiality
differs dramatically from that under United States law. The seminal case is
IBCOS Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd141 in which
Jacob J rejected the United States approach earlier adopted by Ferris J in John
Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders and Chemtec Ltd142 in the following terms:
‘For myself I do not ﬁnd the route of going via United States law particularly helpful. As I have said,
United Kingdom copyright cannot prevent the copying of a mere general idea but can protect the
copying of a detailed ‘‘idea’’. It is a question of degree where a good guide is the notion of over
borrowing of the skill, labour and judgment which went into the copyright work.’143
Jacob J continued by approving the statement of Ferris J that ‘[c]onsider-
ation is not restricted to the text of the code’ and conﬁrmed that the program
structure and design features of the program could also be protected.144 Jacob
J likened these non-literal elements of a computer program to the plot of a
novel.
In Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd145 Pumfrey J conﬁrms
the approach of Jacob J and puts the test for substantiality as follows:
‘The closest analogy to a plot in a computer program lies perhaps in the algorithms or sequences of
operations decided on by the programmer to achieve his object. But it goes wider. It seems to be
generally accepted that the ‘‘architecture’’ of a computer program is capable of protection if a substantial
part of the programmer’s skill, labour and judgment went into it. . . . So in my judgment the
substantiality of what is taken has to be judged against the collection of modules viewed as a whole.
Substantiality is to be judged in the light of the skill and labour in design and coding which went into the
piece of code which is alleged to be copied.’146
Pumfrey J recognizes that the term ‘architecture’ is vague, but nonetheless
states that it could include the functional program structure and intermodular
relationships within the computer program at a high level of abstraction.
Like the United States courts, the English courts therefore protect certain
non-literal elements of a computer program, including the structure,
sequence and organization of the program, by protecting such elements as
detailed concepts incorporated in the expression. In contrast to the United
States, though, the English courts do not limit copyright protection for
purely functional elements of the program code through the use of doctrines
such as merger and scénes à faire.
Potentially, some limitation of the copyright protection for computer
programs can be achieved by focusing on the type of skill, labour and
judgement that is protected by copyright under English law. In particular,
140 For example, standard programming module or the deﬁnition of an interface for a program or for the
data ﬁles used by a program would be extremely difﬁcult to protect under United States law. In contrast see
IBCOS Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd supra note 14.
141 Supra note 14.
142 [1993] FSR 497 (ChD).
143 At 302.
144 These included the deﬁnitions of data ﬁles as used by the ﬁle transfer programs of the defendant.
145 Supra note 108.
146 At 134.
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mere information, facts or other commonplace materials are generally not
protected by copyright under English law, because they are not considered
original.147 The taking of such materials would thus not usually amount to a
substantial taking from the copyright work.148 However, the fact that
something is functional does not necessarily mean that it is commonplace
under English law and it is this difference which leads to the protection of
data ﬁle deﬁnitions and program interfaces by copyright to the detriment of
further development and competition in the marketplace.
Evaluating the substantiality of a part of a computer program under South
African law has only been addressed by our courts in a perfunctory manner,
as previously stated,149 and as a result all that is left is to speculate on a
proposed approach. This is made more difﬁcult by the fact that the South
African legislature has chosen to protect computer programs as sui generis
works, since foreign law invariably protect computer programs as literary
works.150 It is accepted that copyright only protects relevant effort and that
the relevancy of such effort depends on the speciﬁc type of work for which
protection is sought.151 It could thus be argued that the relevant skill, labour
and judgement that are protected by copyright differ between computer
programs and literary works. Consequently, all foreign case law relating to
computer programs could in theory be rejected by our courts as being
inapplicable in the South African context. However, copyright should in
principle protect the intellectual effort spent in making copyright works and
our courts have given indications that such effort spent in the creation of a
computer program will be protected.152
As a result of the historical links and the similarities between the relevant
legislation of the two countries, the tendency of South African courts has
been to follow English law and the statements of Corbett JA in Galago
Publishers (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus153 show that our courts are likely to protect
more than just the literal code of a computer program, and ought to extend
copyright protection to the non-literal elements such as structure, sequence
and organisation of the program, being a ‘detailed collection of ideas’worthy
of protection.
South African law also recognizes that commonplace materials are not
worthy of protection,154 but our courts have tended to grant even wider
147 See Lord Hoffmann in Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd supra note 95 at 25
148 It may for example be argued that some standard programming modules do not warrant protection
since they are commonplace.
149 See note 123.
150 It is worth noting that the South African legislature has not complied with art 10 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which makes the protection of computer programs as literary works obligatory for all
signatories.
151 See note 106.
152 In Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd (C) supra note 19 at 412, the originality of
a computer program depended on the skill and labour expended to create it. See also Haupt t/a Softcopy v
Brewers Marketing Intelligence (SCA) supra note 11 paras 24 and 35.
153 Supra note 88.
154 Waylite Diaries CC v First National Bank Ltd 1995 supra note 118.
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protection to mere information and facts than the English courts.155 Our
courts are thus less likely to limit copyright protection on a purely functional
element of a computer program than the English courts, even if such element
is the only way of expressing something. Unfortunately such an approach
will tend to reduce competition in the software industry and to stiﬂe further
development and innovation. It is thus likely that the legislature will have to
be called upon to address these difﬁculties by creating additional exemptions
from copyright infringement in computer programs.156
CONCLUSIONS
South African courts, like their counterparts elsewhere in the world, are still
grappling with the application of copyright law to computer programs and,
as this article has attempted to show, a number of problems still exist. Most of
these problems can be overcome through the correct use of traditional
copyright principles. However, the utilitarian nature of computer programs
creates additional difﬁculties that traditional copyright principles under
SouthAfrican law will struggle to resolve. Our law, like English law, does not
differentiate between the utilitarian and the artistic or aesthetic, nor do we
have doctrines similar to those found in United States law that can be used to
eliminate some utilitarian parts of copyright works from protectable
expression. As a result South African copyright law can be used to stiﬂe
competition in the software industry and to prevent further innovation or
development, particularly of programs that interoperate with already existing
programs. This problem, as it relates to utilitarian design materials, was
clearly recognized by the legislature when it enacted s 15(3A) of the
Copyright Act,157 which grants an exemption from infringement in respect
of such materials. Similar exemptions, which speciﬁcally cater for the unique
difﬁculties relating to computer programs, are still lacking in South African
copyright law — a deﬁciency that requires urgent attention.158
155 See note 110.
156 Standard programming modules may be adjudged to be commonplace and thus not protectable
following Waylite Diaries CC v First National Bank Ltd supra note 118 and Jacana Education (Pty) Ltd v
Frandsen Publishers supra note 92.
157 The English Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 addresses the same issue rather more
comprehensively in ss 51 to 53 and ss 213 to 235.
158 In this regard it is clear that the exemptions currently incorporated in the English Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988 are probably not entirely adequate, but could nonetheless be a useful starting position.
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